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Abstract
Patch-Match is an efficient algorithm used for structural image editing and avail-
able as a tool on popular commercial photo-editing software. The tool allows
users to insert or remove objects from photos using information from similar
scene content. Recently, a modified version of this algorithm was proposed
as a counter-measure against Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) based
Source Camera Identification (SCI). The algorithm can provide anonymity at a
great rate (97%) and impede PRNU based SCI without the need of any other
information, hence leaving no-known recourse for the PRNU-based SCI. In this
paper, we propose a method to identify sources of the Patch-Match-applied im-
ages by using randomized subsets of images and the traditional PRNU based
SCI methods. We evaluate the proposed method on two forensics scenarios in
which an adversary makes use of the Patch-Match algorithm and distorts the
PRNU noise pattern in the incriminating images he took with his camera. Our
results show that it is possible to link sets of Patch-Match-applied images back
to their source camera even in the presence of images that come from unknown
cameras. To our best knowledge, the proposed method represents the very first
counter-measure against the usage of of Patch-Match in the digital forensics
literature.
Keywords: Patch-Match, PRNU, anonymization, source camera,
identification, source camera verification, verification, digital forensics.
1. Introduction
Photo Response Non-Uniformity Noise (PRNU) was found to be very valu-
able in source camera identification (SCI) since its introduction into the forensics
literature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. It is used by many agencies for identifying the ori-
gin devices of digital images. Robustness of this method was also evaluated
against many edge cases [7, 8] and was even experimented on topics beyond the
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scope of image forensics [9]. Researchers have also looked to improve the han-
dling and querying PRNU fingerprints, from compression [10, 11] to fast search
algorithms [12]. However, as in many forensics & security research, counter
measures against PRNU based SCI were also developed from cloning [13], to
denoising [14, 15] attacks. In many of these counter measures, researchers as-
sumed the knowledge of the underlying methodology of the PRNU fingerprint
estimation and detection prior or during the attack. In contrast, image modi-
fication techniques based on image content, such as seam-carving (which alters
image aspect-ratio) and re-alignment (i.e. panorama) were also considered for
the purposes of anonymization as they distort the spatial synchronization of
the PRNU pattern and were shown to increase the computational cost of SCI
[16, 17, 18].
From the perspective of an adversary, the real advantage of such methods are
their blind applicability. However, alteration of the content and form of images
might not be desirable. A structural image editing algorithm called “Patch-
Match”, in contrast, does not alter the form of the image and the image content
is mostly preserved, which makes it a suitable tool to de-synchronize the PRNU
pattern, and to use against the PRNU based SCI was first reported in 2016
[19]. Using this method, the authors efficiently redistributed the pixels of image
patches to produce shuffled, but good looking images. This can be done without
neither any prior evaluation of potential detection schemes nor any information
related to the camera. As a result, the source cameras of patch-matched images
are hardly identifiable. This notion gives any adversary the ability to become
anonymous against PRNU based SCI using the Patch-Match algorithm as a
low-cost, “one-click solution”.
In this paper, we evaluate a strategy that can be adopted against Patch-
Match based PRNU counter-forensics attack. Since the PRNU pattern be-
comes very distorted after this attack, the individual Patch-match-applied im-
ages could not be linked to their PRNU fingerprints directly. However, our
studies have shown that, such images can be grouped randomly into small sub-
sets, and subsets having the majority of images from a questioned camera can
be determined successfully with the proposed strategy. Specifically, we would
like to answer the following questions regarding this attack:
• Can we verify the source camera device of a set of Patch-Match-applied
images taken with the same camera device?
• Can we identify the source camera device of images anonymized with
Patch-Match algorithm in a mixed image set comprising images taken
with two different cameras?
To answer these questions, we have simulated two different scenarios and con-
ducted experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach.
Our analysis in this paper have been conducted on the dataset cited in [20,
21]. The patch-match attack implementation is the one mentioned earlier in this
paper [19]. Interested readers can also access the Patch-match-applied version of
the dataset used in this study here: github.com/akarakucuk/2019 PM SCI DATA/.
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2. Photo-Response Non-Uniformity Based Source Camera Identifica-
tion and Patch-Match Algorithm
In this section, we are going to introduce the PRNU based Source Cam-
era Identification scheme and the Patch-Match algorithm very briefly. In the
next section, we outline the the proposed method to identify subsets of images
processed by the Patch-Match algorithm.
2.1. PRNU Based Source Camera Identification: The conventional method
In a camera sensor, photo-sites’ response l to a photon intensity l0 varies
as a result of the imperfections in manufacturing process which is called as
Photo-Response Non-Uniformity Noise (PRNU). These variations generates a
noise pattern (PRNU fingerprint) denoted by F that was proportional to the
size of a sensor and serves as a attributable link to a particular imaging sensor.
Extraction of PRNU fingerprint could be explained through imaging sensor
output model used in [22, 6] with matrix notation: L = L0 + L0F + Γ where
Γ represents other, mostly-random noise sources and L0 represents all intensity
values apparent to the sensor for a still image. The PRNU fingerprint F could
be estimated from a number of wavelet noise residues W1, ...,Wn [4], s.t. W =
L− denoiser(L), using the MLE estimator shown in [23]:
Fˆ =
∑n
i=1 WiLi∑n
i=1 L
2
i
(1)
and in [6] and then be used to find similarity between a noise extract Wi of a
query image Li and MLE-estimated PRNU pattern, Fˆ with peak-to-correlation
energy (PCE) ρ = PCE(Wi,LiFˆ) which uses normalized correlation operator
between the residue and the PRNU fingerprint with notable modifications [6].
2.2. PRNU De-synchronization Attack by Patch-Match
Patch-Match is an algorithm used for in-painting of images. It works by
computing a dense neighborhood field of image patches with a pre-defined size,
and uses information to match and replace such patches. Commercially avail-
able implementations of the method can exchange such blocks between images
of multiple scenes at almost real-time. The algorithm can be forced to a single
image to insert or remove contents. The PRNU de-synchronization attack im-
plementation of it also imposes restrictions to avoid matching of a block by itself
[19], and applies additional filtering to avoid significant degradation of image
quality.
As Patch-Match shuffles a given image with its most similar patches, it im-
plicitly breaks the synchronization between the noise residue of a Patch-Match-
applied image and a PRNU fingerprint of the camera that took the image, by
distorting the spatial correspondence between the noise residue and the PRNU
pattern.
This gives the Patch-Match based attack the advantage of blind applicability,
as it requires neither an analysis nor any prior information other than the image
3
(a) PCE=2646 (b) PCE=1531 (c) PCE=872 (d) PCE=1502
(e) PCE=5.6
36dB,MPR=83%
(f) PCE=0.2
35dB,MPR=86%
(g) PCE=4.8
30dB,MPR=90%
(h) PCE=-0.9
35dB,MPR=84%
Figure 1: Example images. Images in the first row are original, whereas those in the
second row are PM-images. In addition, the first column’s images are from camera
A57, the second’s from D7000, the third’s from D90 and the last column’s are images
from 60D. Under each PM-image, PSNR in terms of dB and MPR values are also
noted. For MPR description and equation, please see Section 3 and Eq. 4. Example
images are trimmed to 158× 158 pixels in size, with half scale for better viewing.
it is being applied to. This advantage makes the method very versatile to the
conventional PRNU based SCI approach. In Figure 1, a few examples of Patch-
Match-applied images can be seen along with image quality levels in terms of
PSNR.
The Patch-Match-applied images tend to become flatter, and lose some fine
details (such as the thin lines and small spots) w.r.t. their original counterparts.
The example images in Figure 1 show the effect of Patch-Match algorithm.
Reduction in PCE value is evident, and images still have acceptable image
quality. Please note that both versions are re-compressed only once and trimmed
from the very same coordinates.
On the use of terminology, we would like to indicate that in the rest of the
paper we use “PM” as a short-hand to refer to the Patch-Match algorithm,
and “PM-images” to indicate images that have been processed with the PM
algorithm. More information on the use of remaining notation will be provided
in the coming sections.
4
3. Source Attribution of Images Anonymized with Patch-Match Al-
gorithm
To be able to gain SCI opportunity on PM-images, we looked for weaknesses
of the PM from the perspective of a forensic analyst. The PM attack exploits
the redundancies (similarities) within a given image and shuffles small portions
of images with other, same sized portions. The redundancies here are specific
to each scene content, thus they can be assumed to be randomly distributed
between different scenes.
This gives us an initial idea for identifying the sources of PM-images, by
incorporating multiple PM-images, we can attribute these image combinations
to their sources. Our next observation is regarding the differences between a
PM-image and its source.
That is, on each image we evaluated, the ratio of pixels that stood the same
was around 15% on average, and fluctuated between 55% to 8%. This indicates
that it may be possible to attribute the source of PM-images to their originating
camera, however it may require more than one image to do so, in other terms,
we can merge the noise residues from PM-images, then check for similarities
between this “merged” noise residue and the PRNU fingerprint of the analyst
which is assumed to be taken from pristine images of the query camera. For all
experiments, we assume that the analyst is able to estimate a PRNU fingerprint
from 25 pristine images from the query camera and denote this estimate with a
bold symbol Fq.
The adversary, on the other hand, has applied several countermeasures
against SCI: PM and meta-data removal on any incriminating image he has.
Having received a storage media full of incriminating images which have un-
known origin, and a query camera, the analyst’s task is seemingly simple: Find-
ing out if any incriminating image on this disk was obtained with the query
camera.
The analyst estimates the PRNU fingerprint of the query camera, Fq. Using
this estimate, she tries to attribute the incriminating images on a storage media
with the query camera using the classical PRNU based SCI methods. As all
images originating from the query camera were PM-images, this attempt fails.
However, using the proposed method, she can try to see if combining subsets of
these images would increase his/her chances to attribute these subsets of images
to the query camera. As our results will show, using the proposed method, she
will have more chances to link the image subsets with at least one PM-image
from the query camera, and in some cases has 100% chance to find subsets of
images which have at least one PM image from the query camera.
Briefly, we’ll consider two scenarios: Scenario #1 shows when the storage
media contains only PM-images that originate from the query camera. The disk
content for the Scenario #2 on the other hand, is mixed and has three types
of images, with the following ratios: i) 50% of the total disk content is from
PM-images of the query camera; (ii) 25% PM images that originate from the
unknown camera, and lastly (iii) 25% original images from the unknown camera.
Images used in the scenario #1 will be called Sα, and those used in Scenario
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Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code for PRNU Subset and Fusion SCI using Small
Image Sets
inputs:
X← list of all images in the storage media;
K ← initialize the number of subsets to 100;
τ ← initialize PRNU similarity threshold to 50 in terms of PCE;
n← subset length;
q ← query camera label;
Fq ← load the PRNU fingerprint of query camera;
o← unknown camera’s label;
p← corresponding Case ID from q and o;
Sα ← list of PM-images from query camera (q);
Sβ ← list of PM and non-PM-images from unknown camera (o);
Φ← ∅ initialize an empty fusion set;
S = {X1, ...,XN} ∈ {Sα ∪ Sβ} ← populate image set (file paths);
iteration:
for k := 1 to K do
Sk ← A new subset of n randomly selected images from S within the
loop according to Eq. 3;
Fk ←GenerateFingerprint(Sk);
ρk ← PCE value between Fk and Fq;
if ρk ≥ τ then
Φp ← Φp ∪ {Sk}, add the set of image paths into fusion set;
return kth subset (Sk) and PCE value (ρk);
end
end
if Φp is not empty then
Fp ← GenerateFingerprint(Φp);
%p ← PCE value of Φp;
return pth fusion set (Φp) and PCE value (%p);
end
#2 will be called SΣ.
In this section, for the purpose of simplicity, we are going to denote a
“pseudo-operator” denoted with GenerateFingerprint(S) to describe a PRNU
fingerprint generation function. This function accepts any list of images S,
s.t. S = {image1.png, image2.png, ...}, and it is essentially a wrapper for the
process of PRNU fingerprint estimation, as shown in Eq. 1 thus produces
a PRNU fingerprint estimate from any given set of image list S, such that
FS = GenerateFingerprint(S). Whenever we want to specify a specific type of
images, we add a subscript next to the set, e.g. Sα.
The subscripts denote the origin of the image set, where α represents the
PM-images from the query camera (with camera PRNU fingerprint known to
the analyst), β represents both PM and pristine images from unknown cameras
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(whose PRNU fingerprints are unknown to the analyst). If, however, both two
collections are used, the subscript Σ is used. Similarly, whenever we say, “PCE
of S” we refer to a PRNU similarity value in terms of PCE, between a PRNU
fingerprint generated from a set S, and the query camera PRNU fingerprint Fq
the analyst has,
“PCE of S” = PCE(Fq,FS), (2)
and S is any set of images.
The Algorithm 1 shows the procedure we used for PRNU subset SCI. More
information about the scenarios will be given in Section 4.
S1
PCE of Sk  50
. . .
S2
SK
S4
S3
SK 1
| k|=n
subsets Sk
SK 2
Set S
S
Figure 2: Image subsets
One approach for the attribution subsets of PM-images to their source cam-
eras would be to generate PRNU fingerprints for all possible combinations in a
given image dataset (N images), which would consist of K = 2N−1 fingerprints.
Assuming there were N = 30 images, a total of 1.07× 109 fingerprints would be
needed. On the other hand, if we were to reduce the number of combinations,
K number can be selected sparsely, e.g. from subsets with length of 5 samples
to 20 samples with 5 increments, then the number of fingerprints would reduce
to one fifth of the previous amount, which would be still far from practical.
We therefore limited the number of fingerprints to 100 in each experiment, by
limiting the number of subsets to 100 for each 4 subset size in all scenarios we
will present.
In Figure 2, a diagram outlining the usage of subsets is given. As shown
in the figure, each subset Sk is populated by randomly sampling the whole set
S with the subset size, n. These subsets are allowed to overlap, however each
one is unique. Such that, there are K = 100 subsets, each having cardinality n,
where n = 5, 10, 15, 20, and any subset is chosen to not be identical with any
other subset, which can be formally stated for each n value, as:
7
Si 6= Sj ⇒
∣∣ Si ∩ Sj ∣∣< n (3)
where Si and Sj are any two subset populated within the loop in the algo-
rithm, with |Si| = |Si| = n. If the PCE of any subset is found over the threshold
τ , for example the PCE of ith subset Si > τ , the content (list of image paths)
of the subset is then added to the pth fusion set, Φp. When the loop ends, the
PCE of Φp is used to calculate the PRNU similarity of the fusion set populated
within the loop. τ is set to 50 along this paper as the PRNU similarity threshold
in terms of PCE as discussed as the lower end in [6]
4. Experimental Setup & Results
In this section we describe the environment of our experiments for the pro-
posed approach to source camera attribution of PM-image subsets, starting with
the creation of the PM database in Section 4.1, then we explore two main sce-
narios an analyst may face for SCI on PM-image sets. The first one (in Section
4.2) is the homogeneous scenario, where the PM-images are captured only from
the known “query camera”, which can be presumed as the easiest scenario for
any SCI task. Followed by the second scenario in Section 4.3, the heterogeneous
scenario, in which the analyst has to find a link between incriminating images
from a query camera within a set of images including images from an unknown
camera, denoted as “unknown camera”.
4.1. Creating a PM-image dataset
In this study, the dataset we used is based on the Realistic Tampering dataset
in [20, 21], which consists of pristine images along with their manipulated version
for four different cameras, each having 55 pristine images with single resolution,
which is 1920× 1080 pixels without meta-data fields.
From these pristine images, we randomly selected a list (file names) of 25
images to estimate the camera PRNU fingerprint. The list of the remaining 30
images were reserved for tests.
The PM implementation we targeted produces only gray-scale images and
trims each image by 7 pixels from each side (the trim size is the size of patch
window size minus one, where the patch window size is 8× 8). It is possible to
overcome the gray-scale limitation, but we preferred to execute the method as
it was in the original paper. As the size and color differences between images
might influence our study, we produced two versions for each image: a) PM
version, b) non-PM version. Naming convention for these versions are as the
follows; “out-pm-before-file.ext” for the non-PM version, and “out-pm-after-
file.ext” for the PM version. The interested readers can find links to the dataset
in: github.com/akarakucuk/2019 PM SCI DATA/.
The non-PM images were generated by applying the very same crop settings
and color conversion. These images were then used to generate the query cam-
era’s PRNU fingerprint estimate, Fq using the selected list mentioned earlier.
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This way, we have a PM version for each non-PM image, which are both
saved once without compression, and allowed us to be able to compare and
evaluate the manipulation caused by PM in terms of the manipulated pixel’s
rate (MPR) and the image quality (PSNR). Some example images are given in
Figure 1.
We would like to highlight that, out of the images we mentioned we would
use for evaluations of PM-images, there were a few images (1 for A57, 3 for
D90), which were still identifiable by the PRNU based SCI. At a first glance,
inclusion of these images in our evaluations might be more realistic. However,
such images should be simply filtered-out by running individual images through
the conventional PRNU based SCI or by running the proposed algorithm by set-
ting n to 1. Including these images can be problematic in certain scenarios, for
example in Scenario #2 in the Section 4.3, the PRNU similarity of subsets dom-
inated by non-matching images could also be lifted over the decision threshold,
which could in turn produce a lower performance. By the same token, should we
choose to include them in our evaluations in Scenario #1, Section 4.2, it could
have served as make-up to our proposed methods’ advantage and produce higher
performance. Therefore, we opted not to make use of these PM-images when
the performance of the proposed method was evaluated anytime Fq corresponds
to these cameras. Please note that these 4 individual images are included if the
camera PRNU fingerprint estimate Fq was not either A57 or D90.
Readers are referred to Table 1 and its accompanying figure, Fig. 3 to have
an understanding regarding the initial state of the dataset. The referred table
and the figure show the values of initial PCE, PSNR and Manipulated-Pixel-
Rate (MPR) between the PM and the non-PM image versions. The latter shows
the percentage of changed pixels of each image pair, and calculated simply by,
MPR [%] = 100× 1
R× C
R∑
r=1
C∑
c=1
sign(|L(r, c)− Lpm(r, c)|) (4)
while ignoring signum function sign() at value 0. Here, L denotes the non-
PM version, Lpm denotes the PM version of an image. R and C are the width
and height values in pixels. Also in the table are the camera labels that were
used to name the cameras. The values given in Table 1 are median values, and
they show the manipulation efficiency of the PM, when compared to non-PM
values in terms of PCE. For all cameras and images, the observed PCE values
were found very low, with high PSNR and MPR rates.
4.2. Scenario #1: Performance on Homogeneous Image Subsets
In this scenario, we evaluate the performance on a case where the storage
media contains PM-images from only the query camera, which represents the
most hygienic scenario an analyst can face face in any circumstance. Please
recall that these 100 image subsets were populated randomly, each including 5
to 20 (n) image to reasonably increase the recall rate of the images as mentioned
in Section 3.
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Table 1: Properties of the Patch-Match Image Data-set. MPR stands for Manipulated Pixel
Rate, which is the percentage of pixels that have changed after application of Patch-Match.
The metrics shown in the table are median values.
Camera Number of PCE PSNR MPR
Make Label Images non-PM PM [dB] [%]
Sony A57 29 1963 1.05 38 85
Nikon D7000 30 888 2.92 36 78
Nikon D90 27 1231 0.14 33 86
Canon 60D 30 1289 1.91 34 86
A57 D7000 D90 60D
Camera Labels
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
 = 50
55
PC
E
(a) PCE distribution per camera
A57 D7000 D90 60D
Camera Labels
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
PS
NR
 [d
B]
(b) PCE distribution per camera
Figure 3: Distributions of PRNU similarity and the image quality of each image in the PM
database per camera. In the left the PRNU similarity in terms of PCE and in the right, the
image quality metric, PSNR in terms of dB were given.
The PCE values are given in Table 2 and indicate a few cases where the set
attribution approach may fail. Specifically, the D90 has an unexpected result,
where the performance gets worse with elevated n values. One possible explana-
tion could be based on the initial median values of PM-images for this camera
(Table 1) which is, 0.14 for PCE. This is an eighth of its closest performer, A57
camera in the same test, which was 1.05. The distribution of the values is also
similar in terms of both PCE and PSNR distribution for this particular camera,
as it can be seen in Fig. 3. This indicates that the majority of images from D90
are more heavily affected by PM, the performance of D90, with only one subset
with n=5 was above the PCE threshold. We’ll compare this and other results
more closely through the coming table, Table 3.
Table 3 shows the results from the fusion set, broken down by each camera
label and subset size (n) the test was conducted on. The fusion sets were
populated by setting Sβ constantly to ∅ in Algorithm 1, in order to be in line
with the Scenario #1. In Table 3, |Φp| denotes the total number of images
i.e. cardinality, of each fusion set and their PCE values, s.t. PCE of Φp. PCE
values here represent the PRNU similarity when all images in each fusion set
were incorporated. The “Recall” value were also given in this table, which shows
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Table 2: Scenario #1, Median and Average PCE values of PM-image subsets, with the ex-
ception of n=1∗ which does not from a subset and provided only as a reference. Values above
the detection threshold are emphasized in bold characters.
Camera Median PCE Maximum PCE
Label n=1∗ n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20 n=1∗ n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20
A57 1.1 14.3 36.0 51.6 77.0 45.3 82.7 80.6 94.1 109.3
D7000 2.9 11.5 18.2 36.0 45.9 23.7 48.1 63.2 71.9 83.9
D90 0.1 3.7 7.4 9.7 12.6 27.9 55.7 43.8 35.9 27.9
60D 1.9 13.1 22.3 33.3 47.2 32.1 54.2 52.5 80.6 79.9
the recall rate of PM-images that belong to the labeled device populated into
the fusion set, formally given by:
Recall [%] = 100× |Φp||Sα| . (5)
There are missing fusion sets, denoted with “–” in the table. For example on
D7000, there was no fusion set for n=5, meaning none of the PM-image subsets
for this camera with this subset size were reached over PCE value threshold
τ . In addition, D90 also indicates that there is only one subset of PM-images
brought together a combined PRNU noise pattern that matched with the cam-
era’s PRNU fingerprint estimate. The results from the remaining sets (n=10
to n=20) through this scenario confirm this one-off situation as none of them
provided similar rates.
It is evident in this table that the proposed method has reached complete
recall with n=15 on all the three cameras, however, in D90, only 18% of the
PM-images were covered with a PCE value of 55.7 on n=5. In this table,
it is also evident that the increased cardinality values meet with decrease in
PRNU similarity in terms of PCE. The most notable is D7000, where the PRNU
similarity drops from 83.2 to 67.3 when the fusion set reached from about half of
the PM-images to all of such images. Similar tendencies are evident for different
cameras as well. The exception is also the camera D7000, where none of the 100
subsets with cardinality 5 (n=5) did not reach or exceed the PCE threshold.
This may indicate a need to increase the number of randomly selected subsets.
On a different note, the PRNU similarity of the PM-images from non-
matching devices were also observed to see if such subsets can reach or exceed
the threshold. As expected, there was none. The results regarding the non-
matching and matching camera PM-images for a few example cameras were
plotted in Fig. 4. More details regarding the results from the non-matching
cases were omitted as they all give the same outcome.
4.3. Scenario #2: Performance on Heterogeneous Image Sets from Camera
Pairs
In this scenario, to evaluate the performance of the proposed method when
images from an unknown origin are also present along with PM-images of the
11
Table 3: Scenario #1: Details of fusion sets. “–” represents cases without an outcome. PCE
column represents PCE of Φp.
Camera Fusion Set Recall
Label n |Φp| PCE Value [%]
A57
5 22 100.2 22/29 76
10 29 100.0 29/29 100
15 29 100.0 29/29 100
20 29 100.0 29/29 100
D7000
5 – – – –
10 16 83.2 16/30 53
15 30 67.3 30/30 100
20 30 67.3 30/30 100
D90
5 5 55.7 5/27 18
10 – – – –
15 – – – –
20 – – – –
60D
5 9 82.8 9/30 30
10 24 81.7 24/30 80
15 30 68.7 30/30 100
20 30 68.7 30/30 100
n=1 n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
 = 50
PC
E
(a) Non-matching PM-images.
n=1 n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20
Subset Lengths |Sk|
0
20
40
 = 50
60
80
100
PC
E
(b) Matching PM-images.
Figure 4: In (a) non-matching case (PM-image subsets from Canon 60D and PRNU fingerprint
from Sony A57) and in (b), matching case (PM-image subsets from Sony A57 and PRNU
fingerprint from Sony A57). The PRNU similarity values of these subsets were obtained
against Fq of Sony A57. In both figures, boxes on the far left are for the subset size of n=1∗
and only given to serve as a reference PCE distribution for per-image statistics.
query camera in the storage media.
To do so, we’d like to start by elaborating the concept of Case IDs. A
Case ID simply refers to a specific pair of source cameras as shown in Table
4. For example, the Case ID 1 represents a pair when the storage media has
images from both camera A57 and D7000. When all images (59) from these two
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Table 4: Scenario #2: Properties of Cases. The right-most column represents PCE value
when all images from both cameras are combined. |Sα| and |Sβ | represents number of images
in the PM-image set from the query camera and mixed type of images (PM-image + original)
from the unknown camera listed in each row.
Case Camera Labels PCE
ID Query Unknown |Sα| |Sβ | of SΣ
1 A57 D7000 29 30 32.5
2 A57 D90 29 30 30.7
3 A57 60D 29 30 78.3
4 D7000 A57 30 30 25.6
5 D7000 D90 30 30 57.0
6 D7000 60D 30 30 23.2
7 D90 A57 27 30 12.1
8 D90 D7000 27 30 6.2
9 D90 60D 27 30 4.3
10 60D A57 30 30 45.9
11 60D D7000 30 30 26.0
12 60D D90 30 30 40.1
cameras, which we denote by SΣ, were merged, the PRNU similarity is found
as 32.5 as listed on the first row under the PCE column, s.t. PCE of SΣ for
Case 1, in the same table. Please recall, SΣ term denotes a collection of images
from two different cameras. The analyst is assumed to have knowledge of the
PRNU fingerprint he gathered from a separate set of 25 pristine images only
from the query camera. Also recall that the storage media the analyst received
only has PM-images from the same query camera, whereas the images from the
unknown camera has 50% chances of being a PM-image, to be avoid of any form
of bias. In Table 4, initial PRNU similarities observed in terms of PCE of the
listed cameras were also given.
To remind the readers about the PRNU Subset and Fusion SCI algorithm,
we would like to refer once again to Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, p represents a
descriptor for camera pairs, which is an integer ranging from 1 to 12 with subset
sizes n starting from 5 to 20, with 5 image increments. Same number of random
subsets (K=100) for each length per each pair were selected, as indicated in the
algorithm with subscript k. Thus, the range of these values are p=1, 2, ..., 12,
n=5, 10, 15, 20 and k=1, 2, ..., 100, as indicated in Table 4. Please also note that
the total number of images (|SΣ| = |Sα ∪ Sβ |) vary slightly on different pairs.
The initial state of the PRNU similarities observed from the table indicates
that in two cases (Case 3 and 5), the analyst might find it especially hard to
distinguish images from both cameras if they were naively combined and could
end up with 50% probability of mislabeling images from the unknown camera.
The proposed method, on the hand, can achieve up to 100% precision on 6
different cases as shown in Table 6.
For each case listed in the Table 4, PRNU noise from 100 randomly populated
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Table 5: Scenario #2, PRNU values above the detection threshold are emphasized in bold
characters, with the exception of n=1∗ which does not constitute a subset and provided only
as reference. Please note that the maximum values in the n=1∗ column are the same as
Scenario #1. Values above the detection threshold are emphasized in bold characters.
Case Median PCE Maximum PCE
ID n=1∗ n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20 n=1∗ n=5 n=10 n=15 n=20
1 0.2 2.1 5.1 5.6 11.2 45.3 41.8 52.7 33.9 39.7
2 0.1 1.5 6.0 7.8 11.0 45.3 65.1 37 41.3 44.6
3 0.5 6.0 14.8 19.8 23.8 45.3 47.7 59.3 66.5 74.6
4 0.1 3.2 5.5 6.6 10.5 23.7 36.6 32.7 49.5 39.2
5 0.6 5.3 11.9 14.1 19.5 23.7 35.5 58.2 63.4 54.3
6 0.3 2.7 3.8 6.8 6.2 23.7 24.9 33.7 37.6 50.2
7 0.2 0.9 2.6 4.4 4.4 27.9 19.5 27.3 21.1 24.2
8 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.1 3.5 27.9 34.4 19.4 19.7 33.3
9 0.0 0.3 0.7 2.0 2.4 27.9 34.7 30.2 31 21.6
10 1.0 4.2 7.3 11.8 15.3 32.1 39.3 45.3 43.6 57.2
11 0.7 2.4 3.9 7.0 9.1 32.1 25.4 32.6 27.1 35.6
12 0.2 2.6 6.8 10.0 13.6 32.1 31.2 44 39.1 45.6
subsets, each having the subset sizes of n = 5, 10, 15, 20 number of images were
used to estimate a PRNU fingerprint and correlated with the query PRNU
fingerprint Fq. The median and maximum PCE values from these subsets were
shown in Table 5.
In Table 5, values from all subsets are given and values over the threshold
are emphasized in bold characters. This table shows the PRNU similarity of
the incorporated subsets in terms of PCE values. In many cases, the subsets
did not reach or exceed the threshold, but any subset having a PCE value over
the threshold were incorporated for each n and p which forms the fusion set Φp,
and all images in this set were then used to re-calculate the final PCE of Φp.
The results and the number of images in the fusion set along with the Precision
rates for each case are shown in Table 6. Precision value shows the ratio of
PM-images from the query camera in the fusion set, and in terms of percentage,
can be formally given as:
Precision[%] = 100× |Φp ∩ Sα||Φp| (6)
In Table 6, there are only two cases, Case 3 and 5 that produced a fusion
set for plural number of subset sizes, namely, for n=10,15 and 20. This calls
for a further elimination for these fusion sets, which can be done by finding the
intersection of fusion sets for all available n values. This produces |Φp=3| = 18
which has 14 PM-image from the query camera, and improves the precision to
78%, which is higher than all individual fusion sets, which have a maximum
precision of 69%. Another such case is Case 5, where the precision, with this
type of elimination yields with 4/6 and 67%, which was the maximum value in
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Table 6: Scenario #2: Details of the fusion sets. Cases without an outcome are represented
with “-” mark.
Case Fusion Set Precision
ID n |Φp| PCE Value [%]
1 10 10 52.7 9/10 90
2 5 5 65.1 5/5 100
3
10 26 92.1 18/26 69
15 46 92.4 26/46 57
20 47 90.2 26/47 55
4 – – – – –
5
10 10 58.2 4/10 40
15 24 77.9 16/24 67
20 33 64.5 17/33 52
6 20 20 50.2 14/20 70
7 – – – – –
8 – – – – –
9 – – – – –
10 20 32 63.3 18/33 59
11 – – – – –
12 – – – – –
this case when n=15 in the same table. This type of elimination can find its
use for highly critical tasks.
In Table 7, a summary showing the overall performance of the algorithm for
this scenario is given, broken down for each n values. Here, the column labeled
as “C” indicates the cases where the algorithm produced any subset having a
PRNU similarity over the threshold in terms of PCE value. Values indicated
under column “Average Φ” shows the average length of fusion sets for available
cases.
There are three metrics, namely, “T.Precision”, “T. Recall” and “Selection”.
The last metric shows the representation rate of images in fusion sets, which
is calculated by dividing the total number of images in the fusion sets to the
total number of images in the represented cases, which can be written by using∑
p∈C operator which is used to restrict the results to cases having a fusion set,
as:
Selection [%] = 100×
∑
p∈C |Φp|∑
p∈C |SΣ|
(7)
The other values in the Table 7, “T.Precision” and “T.Recall” denotes for
Total Precision and Total Recall and indicates how well the proposed method
worked in terms of accuracy and sensitivity. These were also calculated by
summing over p ∈ C, given by:
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Table 7: Scenario #2: Performance of PRNU based SCI w.r.t. each subset length n.
Cases T.Precision T.Recall Selection Average
n C Value [%] Value [%] Value [%] of |Φ|
5 2 5/5 100 5/29 17 5/59 8 5
10 1,3,5 31/46 67 31/88 35 46/178 26 15
15 3,5 42/70 60 42/59 71 70/119 59 35
20 3,5,6,10 76/132 58 76/119 64 132/239 55 33
Table 8: Scenario #1: The T. Recall rates of fusion sets w.r.t. the subset length (n) and the
number of subsets (K). The columns under percentage symbol are the average recall rates
Eq. 8, and the columns under C denote the number of query cameras producing a fusion set.
n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 20
K |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C
10 5 17 1 15 52 1 20 66 3 29 99 3
20 7 22 2 25 86 1 26 87 3 30 100 3
30 9 29 2 29 100 1 26 88 3 30 100 3
40 9 29 2 20 66 2 28 96 3 30 100 3
50 9 29 2 20 66 2 29 99 3 30 100 3
60 12 41 2 19 63 3 29 99 3 30 100 3
70 14 47 2 20 67 3 29 99 3 30 100 3
80 14 47 2 22 74 3 29 99 3 30 100 3
90 14 47 2 22 74 3 30 100 3 30 100 3
100 12 42 3 23 78 3 30 100 3 30 100 3
Total Recall[%] = 100×
∑
p∈C |Φp ∩ Sα|∑
p∈C |Sα|
(8)
Total Precision [%] = 100×
∑
p∈C |Φp ∩ Sα|∑
p∈C |Φp|
. (9)
The results in Table 7 shows that the most cases were reported with the
subset size n=20, however it also had the lowest Total Precision value. The
best Total Precision was reported when the subset size was the smallest, n=5,
which was expected. Because, by allowing more images in the subsets (with
PCE value over the τ), the chances of including images of unknown origin also
increase. This may indicate that increasing the number of subsets K for smaller
subsets would be a beneficial trade-off for the analyst. The influence of the
number of subsets (K parameter in the Algorithm 1) will be discussed in the
next section.
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Table 9: Scenario #2: The T. Precision rates of fusion sets w.r.t. the subset length (n) and
the number of subsets (K). n and K values without an outcome are represented with “-”
mark. The columns under percentage symbol are the average precision rates in Eq. 9, and
the columns under C denote the number of cases producing a fusion set.
n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 20
K |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C |Φp| [%] C
10 – – – 10 40 1 15 73 1 34 59 1
20 – – – 10 63 3 15 70 2 41 59 1
30 – – – 13 66 3 15 70 2 37 55 2
40 – – – 13 66 3 15 70 2 37 55 2
50 – – – 13 66 3 26 61 2 30 58 4
60 – – – 13 66 3 26 61 2 30 58 4
70 – – – 13 66 3 30 60 2 33 58 4
80 – – – 13 66 3 33 61 2 33 58 4
90 5 100 1 15 67 3 35 60 2 33 58 4
100 5 100 1 15 67 3 35 60 2 33 58 4
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the first SCI method for images processed with
Patch-Match (PM) algorithm. The PM algorithm was originally developed as
an image in-painting algorithm, but recently, its use as an attack method against
PRNU based SCI was successfully demonstrated. Due to its nature, the algo-
rithm changes many pixels (up to 86%), which breaks the synchronization of the
PRNU noise pattern in images, thus making PRNU based SCI almost obsolete
(on 97% of images we have tested) in identifying individual images through the
use of PRNU based SCI method.
We propose to identify such images using a fixed number of small subsets,
and by using the conventional PRNU similarity metric as a guide to reach to
a bigger set, which we call a “fusion set”. The proposed method is evaluated
briefly in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the proposed method was tested
in a homogeneous setting, where the analyst worked to give an answer if all the
incriminating images he received were coming from a suspected, query camera.
In this setting, the proposed method is shown to have up to 100% chance of
finding the images on 3 out of 4 source cameras tested.
In second scenario, the analyst was given a more difficult task, because half
of the images the analyst received are coming from an unknown source. In
this scenario the proposed method increased the likelihood of correct source
identification as well, however there exists quite a few cases (6 out of 12) where
there were no conclusion.
As mentioned earlier, to specify an upper bound in computing time we had
limited the number of small subsets (K) to 100 for all the analysis in this study.
Nevertheless, we would like to discuss the influence of K on the analysis in both
scenarios using the results we have, in Tables 8 and 9. In both tables, the results
were summarized in terms of K, the number of small subsets and n, the number
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of images in the subsets. Regardless of the scenario, increasing the number of
K improves the SCI of more cases and query cameras, however the performance
rates remain stable.
We believe the experiments and dataset released along with this study will
help to advance the digital forensics related SCI research in the era of software-
enriched images.
In our future studies, we plan to work on identifying traces of Patch-Match
on PM-images and evaluate the proposed method outlined in this paper for
manipulations with similar nature, such as image in-painting.
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